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Abstract. As part of their compliance process with the Basel 2
operational risk management requirements, banks must deﬁne how
they deal with information security risk management. In this paper we
describe work in progress on a new quantitative model to assess and
aggregate information security risks that is currently under development
for deployment. We show how to ﬁnd a risk mitigation strategy that is
optimal with respect to the model used and the available budget.
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1 Introduction
Given the constantly changing vulnerabilities that may threaten the security of
a company’s data, how does the company decide where to spend its Information
Security (IS) budget to limit as much as possible the damaging consequences
of attacks? Traditionally, this decision-making process is mostly left to ‘experi-
enced’ staﬀ whose judgment, intuition, and taste is relied upon.
With the upcoming required compliance with the Basel 2 agreements, a
stricter approach has to be adopted: banks must be able to quantify their oper-
ational risk, devise proper ways to contain it, and reserve an adequate budget
to absorb potential damages. Since securing its data assets is part of a bank’s
operations, this applies to IS risk management as well.
In this paper we discuss the issues that need to be addressed to fulﬁl the
IS risk management requirements and describe work in progress on the solution
that is currently under development for deployment. It is generally recognized
that subjectivity is inherent to any risk assessment methodology. Thus, there
is no single ‘a priori’ correct way to approach this problem: the choice of a
model and its various parameters can never be fully objective. An unrelated
requirement is that the proposed solution must allow a user-friendly interface:
our extremely varied world-wide user community of local security oﬃcers and
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business managers must be able and willing to use it and have conﬁdence in the
outcomes.
The formalization provided by our prototype solution and the underlying
model choices, combined with its easy-to-use automated reporting mechanism,
takes away some of the subjectivity of the IS risk management process. The
resulting quantitative approach is consistent on a company-wide basis, leads to
results that are optimal with respect to the model’s quantiﬁcation parameters,
and meets the needs and expectations of local and global security and business
staﬀ. The work described in the present paper represents work in progress and
our prototype may not be ready to meet all requirements for compliance with
the new regulations. For instance, a conscious decision was made not to include
temporal dependencies in the prototype model, in order to make it easier to
access and understand by uninitiated users. At a later stage, and depending
on our ﬁndings with the present approach, reﬁnements may be proposed and
implemented (cf. Remark 4.4).
The IS risk management model proposed in this paper is very similar to
the familiar Annual Loss Expectancy (ALE) approach to risk management [3].
What is novel in our paper is that we argue why an ALE-like approach is the
only alternative for our type of application. Another innovative aspect of our
paper is the way we derive the optimal risk mitigation strategy.
In Section 2 the IS risk management problem that is addressed in this paper is
described in more detail. Various approaches to risk assessment and aggregation
are reviewed in Section 3 along with their pros and cons with respect to our IS
risk management application. This leads, in Section 4, to our quantitative IS risk
management model. In Section 5 it is shown how the IS risk can be optimally
contained in our model by solving a multiple-choice knapsack problem.
2 IS Risk Management
Our goal is to quantify the corporation’s total Information Security risk and to
ﬁnd the most cost-eﬀective way to contain the risk. We reiterate the comment
made above that risk management is subjective. Diﬀerent subjective choices
made in the design or parameters of the model may lead to diﬀerent risk contain-
ment strategies that may all be optimal with respect to their respective models.
The best one can aim for is consistency within the model, overall soundness of
the model, and an on average high level of user acceptance and appreciation of
the results.
More in detail, from an IS perspective the situation is as follows. The corpo-
ration relies on a number of business processes. Each business process is exposed
to a certain current IS risk. As a consequence, the corporation is exposed to
the combined current IS risks of its business processes: the current aggregated
IS risk. Each business process uses a number of applications, where a single
application may be used by more than one process. For each application any
number of IS vulnerabilities may be identiﬁed, and for each such vulnerability
any number of IS threats may exist that realize that vulnerability. The IS threats
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are responsible for the corporation’s aggregated IS risk. For each threat there
may be any number of action plans of varying costs and degrees of eﬀectiveness
to counter the threat. Realization of an action plan against a threat mitigates
the current IS risks of all processes using the application that was aﬀected by
that threat to their residual IS risks. The question is how, given a certain ﬁxed
budget, the action plans should be selected in such a way that the combination
of all mitigated risks, the residual aggregated IS risk, is minimized.
Identiﬁcation of vulnerabilities, threats, and action plans is done on a per
application basis by the process owners, all relevant subject matter experts, and
if possible representatives from the audit, risk, and review department. Because
diﬀerent processes may share applications, these application data may already
have been provided by another business. It is the responsibility of the various
businesses to coordinate and consolidate their views on their shared applications
(cf. Remark 4.3).
A vulnerability would be, for instance, unencrypted customer data sent over
a public network. One of the threats aﬀecting that vulnerability would be an
eavesdropper on the network, and each type of encryption of the data (sym-
metric using a system-wide shared key or using a customer-speciﬁc shared key,
asymmetric, etc.) corresponds to an action plan countering the threat.
An important restriction on the solution to the above problem is that it has
to work in a highly non-uniform environment. Central management is required
(to be able to share vulnerability and threat data about shared applications), but
data about business processes and applications must be entered by the businesses
in many diﬀerent countries on almost all continents. Inevitably the data will be
colored by diﬀerent regulatory and cultural inﬂuences. It is probably impossible
to design a solution that is totally oblivious of all such eﬀects and that works
irrespective of the level of expertise or commitment of the staﬀ that enters the
data. But the robustness of the solution is strongly supported by making it easy
to teach, understand, and use. We believe that the latter is a conditio sine qua
non for an eﬀective IS risk management solution for any even moderately large
company. First, however, we have to discuss what we mean by risk.
3 Risk Assessment and Aggregation
The two most common approaches to risk assessment are qualitative risk anal-
ysis and quantitative risk analysis. The qualitative approach identiﬁes events
aﬀecting a process (cf. threats) and a variety of corresponding controls that may
mitigate the eﬀects of the events (cf. action plans). Based on the perceived rela-
tional model between events and controls the risks are assessed and a strategy is
decided upon, where it is often helpful to associate subjective qualitative rank-
ings (such as High, Medium, Low) to the severity of the events or the eﬀectiveness
of the controls. As a result, the qualitative approach is mostly intuitive. It has
the advantage that no probability data of past events are needed and that it
leads to a reasonable decision model more or less built from scratch.
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A qualitative approach may be applicable in simple situations where a vague
indication suﬃces. For our IS risk management application it is not suitable.
Its lack of precision makes consistency unachievable and, more importantly, the
coarse-grained categorization makes aggregation virtually impossible and mean-
ingless: what overall ranking should one assign the aggregate of four events with
rankings High, Medium, Medium, and Low? And is it better or worse than all
Medium? As a consequence, selecting an adequate set of action plans remains
guesswork without any claims of mathematical rigor or soundness.
The quantitative approach employs as much as possible the distribution func-
tions underlying the events and deﬁnes risk as a certain function of the distribu-
tion function. For instance, the distribution functions may be used to calculate
the Annual Loss Expectancy for a single event, which can then be deﬁned as the
risk of the event. This type of risk can easily be aggregated over any number of
events using standard statistical techniques. This is a consequence of the well
known statistical fact that the expected value of a sum of distributions equals
the sum of the expected values, irrespective of the type and potential depen-
dencies or correlations of the distributions involved. This observation is impor-
tant in circumstances where the precise distribution functions are not known
but where expected losses can be estimated, since only the expected values are
needed. Combined with projected costs and estimated eﬀectiveness of controls,
and deﬁning risk as the expected loss, the best decision with respect to the resid-
ual aggregate expected losses, and as far as allowed by a given budget, can then
be found using analytic methods.
In many industries risk analysis entails more than just minimization, with
respect to a budget, of the expected losses. Although it is certainly relevant to
know the expected losses, for capital management purposes it is also important
to have accurate insight into the variability of the losses and in the Value at Risk
(VaR), the probability that the losses exceed a given amount. But this more gen-
eral quantitative approach (i.e., using more than just expected loss values) is not
applicable in all situations. In the ﬁrst place, it may be hard to collect so many
data that the distribution functions can accurately be determined. This is in par-
ticular the case for so-called heavy-tailed distributions where high impact events
occur with a very low probability; these typically occur in Information Security.
It is illustrated by the observation that diﬀerent companies often select diﬀerent
distribution functions for the same types of events [1]. Furthermore, collecting
enough data to determine the distribution function underlying the behavior of a
certain IS threat is most likely impossible given the fast and constantly changing
IS environment. From this point of view IS risk management is quite diﬀerent
from more traditional insurance and stock portfolio risk management.
An additional problem of general quantitative risk analysis is risk aggrega-
tion. Although loss variation and VaR can be determined per event based on its
distribution function, aggregation of these and similar risk related quantities is
much more diﬃcult than aggregation of the expected losses. To mention some of
the complications this type of risk aggregation runs into: it requires knowledge
of the dependencies and correlations among the events, the problems are notori-
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ously ill-conditioned (thereby requiring many more data points before anything
can be said with any degree of reliability), and the results can be surprisingly
counter-intuitive. To illustrate the latter point, examples have been published of
identically distributed but independent events for which the aggregated VaR is
larger than the sum of the individual VaRs [2]. Strange phenomena of this sort
take place in particular when the distributions involved are heavy-tailed. As
noted above, events to which this may apply are hard to recognize in practice
and their precise distribution functions are, in practice, impossible to determine.
To summarize, the qualitative model is mostly intuitive, lacks any degree
or claim of precision, but has proved to be a valuable tool. The ﬁner points
of risk analysis do not enter into the picture in the qualitative approach, with
the pleasant side-eﬀect that the intricacies and pitfalls of general aggregated
risk analysis are also avoided. But it is not suitable for our application. The
quantitative model, when supported by adequate amounts of data, lays greater
claims to accurateness. Its mathematical underpinnings may inspire attempts
to address more general risk questions. This carries the inherent danger that
over-precise results are obtained and relied upon, while losing sight of the fact
that the underlying distributions cannot be assessed with suﬃcient certainty.
For general aggregated risk problems the analysis can easily be led astray by
intuition. In particular the presence of hard-to-recognize and hard-to-pin-down
heavy-tailed distributions makes any type of intuitive guesswork irresponsible.
This implies that quantitative risk analysis in its full generality cannot be used
for our IS risk management application. That leaves a single alternative for our
application, namely the most simpleminded quantitative risk analysis where risk
is deﬁned as an expected loss value. As argued above, that approach does not
require the actual event distributions or their interactions, reasonable estimates
for the expected losses suﬃce, and aggregation is nothing but simple summation.
This is further explored in the next section.
Obviously, our approach still requires risk quantiﬁcation, which is admittedly
a hard problem, but the degree to which it is needed is as small as can reasonably
be expected for a quantitative approach.
4 IS Risk Management Model
The conclusion from Section 3 is that if we want to have a deﬁnition of IS risk
that is workable in a rapidly changing environment and that allows meaningful
aggregation, then IS risk must be deﬁned as a simple expected value of some sort.
This leads to the following slightly more formal approach to the setup described
in Section 2.
Remark 4.1 The description below is not identical to the prototype that is
actually implemented, but contains all relevant details. A desire for simplicity
and backward compatibility with systems that are familiar to our user commu-
nity has led to some choices that may be unexpected. They have no eﬀect on
the principle of the model. Once enough data are available for analysis, it will
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be investigated to what extent the ‘incongruent’ aspects of the prototype de-
sign adversely aﬀect the outcome. This may lead to small adaptations in later
versions.
The IS risk faced by a business process are due to a breach of either conﬁ-
dentiality, integrity, or availability. For each of these categories the user enters
an estimated loss amount, denoted for business process p by Lc(p), Li(p), and
La(p), respectively. It is assumed that max(Lc(p), Li(p), La(p)) > 0.
The likelihood that these losses are actually incurred depends on the threats
against the process (or rather: the threats realizing the vulnerabilities identiﬁed
in the applications used in the process, cf. Section 2). To estimate this likelihood,
the user characterizes a threat t by selecting three type of threat choices:
– Source of threat, with two possible choices indicating if the threat comes
from a party external (Source(t) = 1) or internal (Source(t) = 0.8) to the
company.
– Access required for the threat, with two possible choices indicating if
remote access (Access(t) = 1) suﬃces to realize the threat or if local access
(Access(t) = 0.6) is required.
– Skill level required for the threat, with four possible choices indicating
the least level of skill required to realize the threat:
• unstructured nontechnical (Skill(t) = 1);
• unstructured technical (Skill(t) = 0.9);
• structured nontechnical (Skill(t) = 0.75);
• structured technical (Skill(t) = 0.25).
A hacker, for instance, would be ‘unstructured technical’, but a script kiddie
would be ‘unstructured nontechnical’.
The current likelihood indicator P (t) of threat t is deﬁned as
P (t) = Source(t) ∗ Access(t) ∗ Skill(t).
These four numeric values remain hidden for the user. A qualitative ranking of
P (t), however, is presented to the user: High if P (t) ≥ 0.6, Low if P (t) < 0.2, and
Medium otherwise. This is done for compatibility and consistency with another
business reporting tool (cf. Remark 4.1). The user gets the option to change the
qualitative ranking; if done so the hidden likelihood indicator is changed: if the
user speciﬁes High and P (t) < 0.6, then replace P (t) by 0.6; if the user speciﬁes
Medium and P (t) ≥ 0.6, then replace P (t) by 0.6 −  for some small  > 0; if
the user speciﬁes Medium and P (t) < 0.2, then replace P (t) by 0.2; if the user
speciﬁes Low and P (t) ≥ 0.2, then replace P (t) by 0.2 − .
Remark 4.2 The various values and formulas used in the calculation of the
likelihood indicators are not crucial to the model. They were chosen because of
their ease of use and because the resulting qualitative rankings are consistent
with the business tool referred to that the user community is already familiar
with. They are by no means the unique values and formulas that achieve these
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goals: additive versions can be made to work equally well and simple table look
up would be just as eﬀective. Our approach follows [5]. See also Remark 4.4.
To indicate what type of loss can be inﬂicted by a threat, the user enters three
bits Tc, Ti, Ta ∈ {0, 1}, where Tc = 1 if and only if the threat may cause a breach
in conﬁdentiality (similar for Ti and Ta with respect to integrity and availability,
respectively). Note that these bits depend just on the threat and not on the
process they may aﬀect (cf. Remark 4.1).
Remark 4.3 As indicated in Section 2, data about threats (as above) and
action plans (as below) should be agreed upon by all businesses using that ap-
plication. One business may originally have entered threat data and action plans
for an application, but other businesses aﬀected by the same threat may review
the data provided and propose changes. It is the responsibility of all parties in-
volved to come to an agreement on the proper values. A welcome side-result of
this interaction is corporate-wide consistency of (and agreement on) the ‘quan-
tiﬁcation’ of the threats and action plans.
Given these values entered by the user, the current IS risk indicator of process p
with respect to threat t is deﬁned as
Rcur(p, t) = max(TcLc(p), TiLi(p), TaLa(p))P (t).
Denoting by S(p) the set of applications used in process p and by T (A) the set
of threats aﬀecting application A, the current IS risk indicator of process p is
deﬁned as
Rcur(p) =
∑
A∈S(p)
∑
t∈T (A)
Rcur(p, t).
If P is the set of all business processes, the corporation’s overall (quantitative)
current aggregated IS risk indicator is deﬁned as
Rcur =
∑
p∈P
Rcur(p).
For an action plan α countering a threat t, denote by tα the residual threat, i.e.,
what remains of t after action plan α has been carried out. For each action plan α
countering a threat t the user characterizes the residual threat tα by entering
the three type of threat values Source(tα), Access(tα), and Skill(tα), similar to
Source(t), Access(t), and Skill(t) above except that they now represent the values
after action plan α has been carried out. This results in the residual likelihood
indicator
P (tα) = Source(tα) ∗ Access(tα) ∗ Skill(tα).
Obviously, for an action plan to be any good, is should be the case that P (tα) <
P (t); it is assumed that this condition holds for all threats t and action plans α
under consideration. As above, and using the same calculations, the qualitative
ranking of P (tα) is presented to the user, who has the option to change it, which
may change the value P (tα). If the resulting P (tα) happens to be larger than
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P (t), which may happen if the user manually changed P (t) or P (tα) values,
P (tα) is set to P (t); action plans for which this happens do not have to be
further considered. The user also enters the projected expense w(α) of action
plan α.
The type of loss bits are, in the present model, not aﬀected by the action
plans (cf. Remark 4.1). Therefore, the residual IS risk indicator of process p with
respect to threat t after action plan α is carried out is deﬁned as
Rres(p, tα) = max(TcLc(p), TiLi(p), TaLa(p))P (tα).
We assume that either zero or at most a single action plan can be carried out
per threat, that action plans cannot be carried out partially, and that diﬀerent
threats have diﬀerent action plans. It is easily seen that this is not a restriction.
In situations were it makes sense to consider a fractional combination of one
or more action plans countering a single threat, one simply enters the relevant
fractional combination of action plans with their partial or cumulative eﬀects
(and expenses) as an alternative action plan.
An allowed set of action plans is a set of action plans that contains at most
one action plan per threat. Let A be an allowed set of action plans and let
w(A) =∑α∈A w(α) be the projected expense of A. The residual IS risk indicator
of process p with respect to threat t after the action plans in A are carried out
is deﬁned as
Rres(p, t,A) =
{Rcur(p, t) if A does not contain an action plan countering threat t
Rres(p, tα) if A contains action plan α countering threat t
and the residual IS risk indicator of process p under allowed action plan set A
is deﬁned as
Rres(p,A) =
∑
A∈S(p)
∑
t∈T (A)
Rres(p, t,A).
Finally, the corporation’s (quantitative) residual aggregated IS risk indicator af-
ter allowed action plan set A is deﬁned as
Rres(A) =
∑
p∈P
Rres(p,A).
Optimal risk mitigation consists of ﬁnding an allowed action plan set A that
minimizes Rres(A). This is trivially solved by determining for each threat t the
action plan α that minimizes P (tα) (in case of conﬂict, select one), and by
deﬁning A as the set of those action plans (which will be allowed due to the
construction). A more interesting problem is how to ﬁnd an allowed action plan
set A that minimizes Rres(A) under a budgetary constraint w(A) ≤ W on A’s
projected expense. That problem is addressed in the next section.
Remark 4.4 The current and residual aggregated IS risk indicators Rcur(p)
and Rres(p,A) for a process p and allowed action plan set A must not and
cannot be interpreted as the expected loss amount for p before and after A.
Any interpretation of that sort would at the very least require introduction of
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a temporal dependency in the model. This may be done, if required, at a later
stage. Similarly, a threat’s likelihood indicator P (t) should not immediately be
interpreted as the probability that the threat is realized. It requires more threat
related data and ﬁne-tuning of the above parameter choices before the likelihood
of a threat’s occurrence can reliably be estimated based on the type of threat
values. It may also be the case that for a reasonably accurate estimate more
threat characteristics are required.
However, we are not convinced that the disadvantage of the introduction of
any extra complications (a steeper learning curve) would be outweighed by the
potential advantages. At present the P (t), P (tα), Rcur(p, t), Rcur(p), Rres(p, tα),
Rres(p, t,A), and Rres(p,A) values by themselves are simply not intended to be
meaningful. What is relevant is the consistency that is achieved by this approach
and the fact that the relative values are meaningful. That allows us to interpret
terms such as Rcur(p, t) as expected values (of some value, up to an unknown
and irrelevant constant scaling factor) and thereby to aggregate them into a
quantitative IS risk indicator using simple summation, as in the deﬁnitions of
Rcur(p), Rres(p,A), Rcur, and Rres(A). It also allows us to ﬁnd an optimal
allowed set of action plans under a budgetary constraint, as described in the
next section. Note that also the values Rcur and Rres(A) by themselves are
hardly meaningful. What is meaningful is the quantity
100(Rcur − Rres(A))
Rcur
because it gives the percentage how much ‘better’ the situation is after carrying
out the action plans in A, with 0% indicating no improvement and 100% that
there is no residual aggregated IS risk left (since Rres(A) = 0).
Remark 4.5 It may be tempting to include a weighting mechanism in the IS
risks to account for ‘relative importance’ of the various business processes. How-
ever, this may be done only if the weights are not correlated to the loss indicator
values, because a correlation would undermine the soundness of the aggregation
method. If risk is no longer deﬁned as the expected value of a linear function
of a loss indicator (as would be the case if loss indicator correlated weights are
included), risk aggregation can no longer be done by summation. Correct ag-
gregation would require the distribution functions underlying the threats and
their correlation behavior, leading to numerous complications and pitfalls (cf.
Section 3 and [2]) and, if those can be solved and avoided, respectively, to con-
siderably more involved deﬁnitions of Rcur(p), Rres(p,A), Rcur, and Rres(A).
Weights that reﬂect the relative importance of businesses may be used if they
are independent of the amount of loss the businesses may incur due to IS failures.
Obviously, this is only meaningful if the same set of weights is used in Rcur and
Rres(A). Our current model does not use weights. Using weights would be one
way to include a temporal dependency in the model.
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5 Optimal Risk Mitigation and Multiple-Choice
Knapsacks
With notation and deﬁnitions as in Section 4 the risk mitigation under budget
constraint problem is as follows:
minimize Rres(A)
subject to the condition that w(A) ≤ W
and that A is an allowed action plan set.
This is a multiple-choice knapsack problem, as deﬁned in [4]. For ease of reference
we present the straightforward translation from the above formulation to the
framework from [4].
Let k be the number of threats (counted over all applications) and let Ni
be the set of action plans for the ith threat, i = 1, 2, . . . , k. Each action plan
α ∈ Ni has an IS risk reduction indicator piα (‘proﬁt’ in [4]) and a projected
expense wiα = w(α) (‘weight’ in [4]): if t is the ith threat, then
piα =
∑
processes p for
which t aﬀects an
application used by p
(Rcur(p, t) − Rres(p, tα)).
For 0 < i ≤ k we include a default ‘free’ action plan α in Ni with w(α) = 0 and
P (t) = P (tα) (and thus piα = 0) for the ith threat t, corresponding to not doing
anything against t. The multiple-choice knapsack problem equivalent to our risk
mitigation under budget constraint problem may then be formulated as:
max
k∑
i=1
∑
α∈Ni
piαxiα
subject to
k∑
i=1
∑
α∈Ni
wiαxiα ≤ W,
∑
α∈Ni
xiα = 1, i = 1, 2, . . . , k,
xiα ∈ {0, 1}, i = 1, 2, . . . , k, α ∈ Ni.
To see the equivalence of both formulations, note that it amounts to switching
the order of the summations: in Section 4 we summed over all threats aﬀecting
a process p to deﬁne Rcur(p) and Rres(p,A), in the alternative formulation we
sum over all processes aﬀected by the ith threat to deﬁne piα. Without loss
of generality it may be assumed that all coeﬃcients piα, wiα, and W are non-
negative integers (if necessary after appropriate scaling).
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Although problems of this sort are known to be NP-hard, they can be solved
quickly in pseudo-polynomial time. In [4] a particularly eﬃcient method is pre-
sented that ﬁnds the optimal solution for any ﬁxed budget constraint W using
dynamic programming. We refer to [4] for a detailed description. For our pur-
poses it is interesting to know that the LP-relaxation of the problem leads to an
almost linear time optimal solution if small variations are allowed in the budget
constraint W. This follows by considering the sequence of weights encountered in
the course of [4, Algorithm 1 Greedy], with respect to which the greedy solutions
built so far are all optimal. Either way, ﬁnding the optimal spending strategy
even for very large IS risk mitigation problems will be a matter of at most a few
seconds.
6 Conclusion
We have presented an easy to use quantitative approach to IS risk manage-
ment that allows a meaningful quantitative interpretation of the eﬀect of risk
mitigation and fast determination of the optimal risk mitigation strategy. The
prototype model is suﬃciently ﬂexible that it allows ﬁne-tuning and other more
substantial reﬁnements, if that is found to be desirable based on practical expe-
rience with the model. At this point in time the prototype’s implementation is
under development for imminent deployment on a world-wide scale.
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